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[L. A. No. 26430. In Bank. Jan. 10, 1962.] 
GEORGE H. CHULA, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR 
counT OF ORANGE COUNTY, Respondent. 
[1] Contempt-Acts Constituting Contempt-Misconduct of At-
torneys.-The failure of an attorney, without valid excuse, to 
be present in court at the announced time for the sentencing 
of a client whom he is representing constitutes a contempt in 
the immedia te view and presence of the court and hence a 
Jirect contempt which the court is empowered to punish sum-
marily under Code Civ. Pro c., § 1211. 
[2] !d.-Order-Recitals.-The requirement that an order ad-
judging a person guilty of contempt in the immediate view 
and presence of the court must recite facts showing acts which 
constitute a contempt (Code Civ. Proc., § 1211) is jurisdic-
tional, and an order which assumes to punish summarily a 
direct contempt of court is void unless it shows on its face 
facts sufficicnt to constitute a legal contempt. 
[3] Id.-Order-Recitals.-In the exercise of the summary power 
to adjudge a person guilty of a direct contempt, the fa cts must 
bc stated in the order holding him in contempt with sufficient 
particularity to show, without the aid of speculation, that a 
contempt actually occurred. 
(4] Id.-Order-Recitals.-An order adjudicating an attorney in 
contempt met the requirement that it show on its face facts 
sufficient to constitute a legal contempt where it stated that 
the attorney, pursuant to a continuance of the case, was 
ordered to return and appear in court at a designated hour on 
• certain date, that the attorney was present and heard and 
und('rstood the order, that he had the ability to appear at 
the ordered time and place, and that he wilfully neglected and 
failed to so appear without sufficient reason or excuse for such 
failure. 
(f,] Id.-Order-Recitals.-A recital, in an order adjudicating an 
att~rncy in contempt for failure to appear in court at a 
deSignated time, that the attorney "had the ability to appear" 
(1) AttorI\('Y's failure to attend court or tardiness as contempt, 
~:; 59 A.L.R. 1272. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 9 et seq.; 
Dr., Contempt, § 11 et seq. 
l;) Sec Cal.J~.2d, Contempt, § 72; Am. JUT., Contempt, § 78. 
celt D' 1_, . .j 19. References: [1] Contempt, § 15; [2,3] Contempt, (ii 'cln)t Contempt, § 59; [5] Contempt, § 61; [6] Contempt, § 80; 
(10) Co ('t mpt, ~ 81; [8] Contcmpt, § 77; [9] Judgments, § 134; 
n cmpt, § 57. 
D 
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was a proper conclusion of ult i lila t t ' fact conclusive on the 
Supreme Court on review. 
[6] ld.-Certiorari-Scope of Review.- The sole function of the 
writ of certiorari in a contempt matter is to annul proceedings 
taken in excess of jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court on such 
review will consider the evidence only for the purpose of as-
certaining whether there was any substantial evidence before 
the trial court to sustain its jurisdiction. 
[7] ld.-Certiorari-Grounds for Annulment of Order.-On review 
of an order adjudicating an attorney in contempt, the question 
whether the acts complained of can constitute a contempt is 
jurisdictional, and in the absence of evidence showing that an 
actual contempt of court was committed, the order of commit-
ment should he annulled. 
[8] ld. - Certiorari - Hearing and Determination.-Where the 
record on certiorari showed that the trial court ordered an 
attorney to appear personally at a hearing on a designated 
date and there I\aS substantial evidence to support the court's 
finding that the attorney had the ability to appear at the 
ordered time and place but nevertheless failed to appear with-
out sufficient reason or excuse for such failure, the trial court 
could justifiably hold him guilty of contempt on the basis of 
his acts as shown by the evidence. 
[9] Judgments - Amendment or Correction - Clerical Errors.-
Where an order or judgment incorrectly records the com-
pleted judicial action of a court, the court can thereafter cor-
rect. clerical errors by making an amendment to its order truly 
reflecting the court's action. 
[10] Contempt-Order-Correction-Clerical Errors. - Where an 
order adjudicating an attorney in contempt showed completed 
judicial action, but there was a clerical error in that it ordE'red 
that defendant (the person whom the attorney was represent-
ing) be taken into custody of the sheriff, while in truth and 
fact the trial court had ordered that the attorney be taken 
into the custody of the sheriff, it was proper for the court to 
correct its clerical error or misprision. 
PROCEEDING in certiorari to r eview an order of the 
Superior: Court of Orange County punishillg petit ioner for 
contempt of court. John Shea, Judge. Affirmed. 
George H. Chula, in pro. per., A. L. Wirin, Ward Sullivan, 
Russell E . Parsons, Julius L. Samson, Joan ~Iartin. Walter 
Gordon, Richard Welch, Z. B. West, P. Basil Lambros and 
Taylor Peterson for P etitioner. 
[6J See Cal.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 80. 
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Stephen K. Tamura, County Counsel, Adrian Kuyper, 
Clayton H . Parker and George F. Holden, Assistant County 
Counsel, for Respondent. 
McCOMB, J.- Petitioner, an attorney at law, seeks a writ 
of certiorari to review an order of respondent court punish-
ing him for contempt of court. 
CHRONOLOGY 
1. September 15, 1960, Ossie Hanson (hereinafter referred 
to as "defendant") retained the law firm of Monroe & Chula 
to represent him in a criminal action charging him with three 
counts of violating sections 288 and 288a of the Penal Code. 
2. Septembcr 30, 1960, and October 26, 1960, a preliminary 
hearing was held in the Municipal Court of the Anaheim-
Fullerton Judicial District, and defendant was bound over to 
answer in the superior court. 
3. January 31, 1961, defendant appeared in the Superior 
Court of Orange County with his counsel, James C. Monroe, 
and moved for a dismissal of all three counts. The court dis-
missed counts I and II, but denied the motion as to count III. 
A jury trial was waived. 
4. Thereafter, following a court trial, defendant was found 
guilty of one count of violating section 288 of the Penal Code. 
Criminal proceedings were suspended and sexual psychopathy 
proceedings instituted, at which defendant was represented 
by petitioner. 
5. :March 17, 1961, defendant's motion for a new trial was 
denied and the matter continued for hearing relatiye to the 
sexual psychopathy proceedings and pronouncement of sen-
tence to March 31, 1961, at 9 :15 a. m., in department 5, and 
petitioner and defendant were ordered to return at that time. 
6. March 31, 1961, when the case of People v. Ossie Hanson 
was called at 9 :50 a. m.,! petitioner did not appear in court. 
However, about 20 minutes later Mr. Mueller, an associate 
of petitioner, came into court and stated that petitioner had 
asked hi~ to appear for him at the hearing. 
7. April 7, 1961, an order to show cause in re contempt 
was issued and sel"Yed upon petitioner, ordering him to appear 
before respondent court at 9 :15 on April 14, 1961, to show 
cause ',hy he should not be punished for contempt. There-
1At the subsequent contempt hearing the court stated it had delayed 
calling the matter because of the absence of petitioner. 
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after by stipulation thc mattcr " 'as continued until April 28, 
1961, at 9 :15 a . m. 
8. April 28, 1961, after a hearing, at which petitioner and 
Mr. Mueller testified in petitiouer's behalf, respondent court 
stated: "It is the judgment of the Court that you are in 
contempt of court. It will be the sentence of this court that 
you be confined to the County Jail for four days." 
9. May 1, 1961, respondent court entered, nunc pro tunc 
as of April 28, 1961, the following order in the case of The 
People of the State of Oalifornia, Plaintiff, vs . Ozzie Hanson, 
Defendant: "JUDGMENT AND ORDER IN RE CONTEMPT. The 
contempt proceedings against George H . Chula herein, having 
come on regularly on an order to show cause before the 
undersigned April 28, 1961, and the said George H. Chula 
appearing in his own behalf, and evidence, oral and docu-
mentary having been presented and argued, and the matter 
having been submitted, and good cause appearing therefor, 
and it appearing that: 1. A lawful order was given to the 
said George H. Chula to return and appear in the same court-
room as the one in which the order was made, to wit: Depart-
ment 5; 2. The order was given pursuant to a continuance of 
this case, in which the said George H. Chula was counsel for 
the defendant; 3. The order was given on March 17, 1961, and 
it was an order to return and appear at 9 :15 a. m., March 31, 
1961; 4. The said George H. Chula was present and heard 
and understood the order; 5. The said George H. Chula had 
the ability to appear at the ordered time and place; and 
6. The said George H . Chula did wilfully neglect and fail to 
so appear without sufficient reason or excuse for such failure . 
"IT Is HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
said George H. Chula is in contempt of this Court in his 
failure to obey such order, and that Defendant be taken into 
custody of the Sheriff of the County of Orange, and be con-
fined to the County Jail for a period of four (4) days; 
"BE IT FURTHER ORDERED that execution of this order be 
stayed for a period of ten (10) days from the date hereof, 
to "Wit: until May 9, 1961, or, if within such period of ten 
(10) days a petition for a writ to alter this order is filed in 
the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of this State, then 
until the granting or'denial thereof becomes final. 
"This order is to be entered nunc pro tunc April 28, 1961. 
"Dated : May 1, 1961. 
John Shea 
Judge of the Superior Court" 
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10. May 2, 1961, the clerk entered the following minute 
order relative to the April 28, 1961, proceedings: "It is the 
judgment of this Court that counsel for defendant, George 
Chula, is in contempt of Court. Said George H. Chula 
ordered confined to the County Jail for a period of four (4) 
days." 
11. May 9, 1961, respondent court entered, nunc pro tunc 
as of April 28, 1961, an amended judgment and order in re 
contempt. The only difference between the order entered 
May 1, 1961, and the amended order was that in the latter 
the words "that the said George H . Chula be taken into 
custody of the Sheriff of the County of Orange" were substi-
tuted for the words "that Defendant be taken into custody of 
the Sheriff of the County of Orange," and the expiration of 
the 10-day period for the stay of execution thereof appears 
as May 19, 1961, instead of May 9, 1961. 
Que.stions: First. Was the order of May 1, 1961, adjudi-
cating petitioner in contempt void for the reason .that it did 
not state facts showing petitioner guilty of contempt t 
No. [1] The failure of an attorney, without valid ex-
cuse, to be present in court at the announced time for the 
sentencing of a client whom he is representing constitutes a 
contempt committed in the immediate view and presence of 
the court and hence a direct contempt which the court is 
empowered to punish summarily under section 1211 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. (Cf, Lyons v. Supe.rior Court, 43 
Cal.2d 755, 759 [5] [278 P.2d 681].) 
[2] An order adjudging a person guilty of contempt in 
the immediate view and presence of the court must recite 
facts showing acts which constitute a contempt. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1211.) This is jurisdictional, and an order which 
assumes to punish summarily a direct contempt of court is 
void unless it shows on its face facts sufficient to constitute 
a legal contempt. (Ral:den v. SlLperior Court, 34 Cal.2d 83, 86 
[2] [206 P .2d 1081] ; In re Wells, 29 Cal.2d 200, 201 [2] 
[173 P.2d 811] ; Ex parte Hoar, 146 Cal. 132, 133 [79 P. 
853].) [3] Such facts must be stated with sufficient par-
ticularity to show, without the aid of speculation, that a 
contempt act,ually occurred. (Blake v. Municipal Court, 144 
Cal.App.2d 131, 136 [7] [300 P .2d 755] [hearing denied by 
the Supreme Court].) 
[4] In the present case it is clear that the order of May 
1, 1961, adjudicating petitioner in contempt meets the fore-
going requirement, since facts are stated therein showing 
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that petitioner in the presence of the court committed a con-
tempt. 
There is no merit ill petitioner's con ten tion that the order 
adjudicating him guilty of contempt d id not state facts but 
merely conclusions of law. [5] A recital that petitioner 
"had the ability to appear" is a proper conclusion of ultimate 
fact conclusive on this court upon r eview. (Ex parte Levin, 
191 Cal. 207, 208 [1] [215 P. 908] ; E x l)a rtc Spc nccr, 83 Cal. 
460, 462 [23 P . 395, 17 Am.St.Rep. 266] ; In re Cal·penter, 
36 CaI.App.2d 274, 276 [1] [97 P.2d 476] ; In re W ilson, 123 
Cal.App. 601, 603 [2] [11 P.2d 652]. ) 
In re McCausland, 130 Cal.App.2d 708 [279 P.2d 820], 
relied on by petitioner, is factually distinguishable from the 
present case. In such case the order was annulled because it 
consisted solely of a finding that the defendant there was 
guilty of "wilfully violating" an ordcr. The court pointed 
out that there was no recital in the order that the petitioner 
had the ability to comply with it. In the present case there is 
such a recital in the order. 
In re Cardella, 47 Cal.App.2d 329 [117 P.2d 908], also 
relied on by petitioner, was expressly disapproved in the later 
case of In re Hadley, 57 Cal.App.2d 700, 703 [135 P.2d 381], 
as being contrary to the great weight of authority. 
Finally, In re Meyer, 131 Cal.App. 41 [20 P .2d 732], cited 
by petitioner, is factually distinguishable from the present 
case, for the r eason that in the Meyer case the petitioner then 
before tbe court was discharged because he had not been 
served with tbe prior order of the court, and special findin gs 
showed his inability to comply with the court's order between 
the date of service of the notice of the order and the date of 
the contempt bearing. 
Second. Were peti tioner's ads contcmptuoHs acts sufficient 
to give the court juri.sdiction to p1lnish him for contempt? 
Yes. [6] The sole function of the writ of certiorari in a 
contempt matter is to annnl proceedings taken in excess of 
jurisdiction, and this court will consider the evidence only 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any sub-
stantial evidence before tbe trial court to sustain its jurisdic-
tion. (Times-Mirror Co . v. Sllpcrior C01lrt, 15 Ca1.2d 99, 115 
[1] [98 P.2d 1029] ; Bridges v. SllperiQ)· COllrt, 14 Ca1.2c1 464, 
484 [8] et seq. [94 P .2d 983] .) 
[7] Tbe question wbether the acts complained of can 
constitute a contempt is jurisdictional, however, and in thc 
absence of evidence sbowing that an actual contempt of court 
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was committed, the order of commitment should be annulleu. 
(Brunton v. 8-llperi01' Coud, 20 Cal.2d 202, 204 [1] [124 P.2d 
831] ; Chula v. Superior Court, 109 Ca1.App.2d 24, 26 [1] 
[240 P .2d 398] ; Wilde v. Silperior Court, 53 Ca1.App.2d 168, 
178 [8] [127 P.2d 560].) Accordingly, we have examined the 
r ecord for the purpose of determinillg whether petitioner's 
acts were in fact contemptuous acts sufficicnt to give the court 
jurisdiction to punish him for contempt. 
The evidence shows that when the matter was called at the 
March 17 hearing, neither petitioner nor defendant was 
present, and the court ordered a bench warrant issued for 
uefendant 's arrest and an order issued for petitioner to show 
cause why he should not be punished for contempt for his 
failure to appear. Petitioner and defendant appeared about 
10 a. m., at which time petitioner said that his calendar showed 
the hearing was set for 10 a. 1Il . anu that he and defendant had 
been waiting in his office. 
A discussion then took place between petitioner and the 
trial judge regarding petitioner's failure to appear at the 
scheduled time at a number of other hearings in the trial 
court. The court vacated the order for ' the bench warrant and 
the order to show cause, and after argument it denied defend-
ant's motion for a new trial. 
The probation department had not been notified of the 
hearing and had not prepared its report. The application 
for probation and pronouncement of judgment were therefore 
continued to :March 31 at 9 :15 a . m., a time set to suit peti-
tioner's convenience. The court admonished petitioner to be 
there at that time ,yith defendant, stating : "Let's remember 
it. 9 :15 a. m. I will set the matter down at 9 :15 a. m. on 
Friday, the 31st day of March, in this courtroom. Each of 
you are ordered and directed to report here at that time." 
The court's minute order of March 17, 1961, reads in part: 
"The hearing re: Ap[llication for probation and pronounce-
ment of judgment is continued to ~rarch 31, 1961 at 9 :15 a . m. 
ill Department 5. George Chula and the defendant ordered 
to return at that time." 
At the hearin:; on the order to show cause there was 
evidence that a ftcr the March 17 hearing petitioner learned 
it would be necessar:v- for him to be in the Indio Branch of -
the Superior Court of Riverside COlll1t)? on March 30 on a 
matter which supposedly would take t\\""o days; that the Indio 
matter was concluded on l\'1arch 30 and petitioner so advised 
his office that eWl1ing; and that due to lack of transportation 
petitioner had spent the night at a friend's home in Palm 
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Springs and did not return to Santa Ana until after 10 a. m. 
March 31. 
The record also shows, however, that when the matter was 
called at 9 :50 a. m. March 31, the court asked defendant 
where his counsel was, and defendant replied, "1 stopped at 
his office and he said he'd 00 here at 9:15, but he isn't here." 
[ 8 ] Accordingly, since the record shows that the trial 
court ordered petitioner to appear personally at the :March 31 
hearing', and there was substantial evidence to support the 
court's finding that petitioner had the ability to appear at the 
ordered time and place but nevertheless failed to appear, 
without sufficient reason or excuse for such failure, the trial 
court could justifiably hold him guilty of contempt on the 
basis of his acts as shown by the evidence. 
Third. Did respondent court lack jurisdiction to amend the 
order of May 1, 1961, in the manner in which it attempted to 
do so, and was the p-nrported amended j1ldgment and order 
in re contempt therefore void' 
No. [9] Where an order or judgment incorrectly records 
the completed judicial action of a court, the court can there-
after correct clerical errors by making an amendment to its 
order truly reflecting the court's action. (Ba.stajian v. Brown, 
19 Ca1.2d 209, 214 [lJ [120 P.2d 9J; Ca1'pente'r v. Pacific 
i1lut. Life Ins. Co., 14 Ca1.2d 704, 707 [lJ [96 P.2d 796J ; 
Waters v. Spratt, 166 Cal.App.2d 80, 85 [3J [332 P.2d 754] ; 
Culligan v. Leider, 65 Cal.App.2d 51, 56 et seq. [149 P .2d 
894] .) 
[ 10] The order of May 1, 1961, showed completed judi-
cial action. However, there was a clerical error, in that it 
ordered" that Defendant be taken into custody of the Sheriff 
of the County of Orange," while in truth and in fact the 
trial court had ordered that petitioner be taken into the 
custody of the Sheriff of the County of Orange. Therefore, it 
was proper for the court to correct its clerical error or mis-
prision. 
The original order2 correctly, except for the clerical error, 
1'2flected the court's decision. 
The trial court's order is affirmed. 
Schauer, J." and White, J ., concurred. 
GIBSON, C. J.- l concur. 
In the usual case of direct contempt all the relevant events 
·Petitioner, in his application and points and authorities, continually 
refers to the clerk'8 minute order of April 28, 1961, as the judgment 
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occur in the immediate view and presence of the court, where-
as indirect contempt ordinarily consists of aets out of the 
presence of the court. In the present case we have what 
might be termed a hybrid situation; the charge of contempt 
arose from events occurring in the presence of the court which 
it is claimed should be excused by mattcrs taking place outside 
the courtroom. 
It is obvious that the disruption of judicial proceedings 
caused by the absence of an attorney occurs in the immediate 
view and presence of the court. The burden of excusing the 
obstruction must, of course, be placed upon the attorney. 
(Lyons v. Superior Court, 43 Ca1.2d 755 [278 P.2d 681].) 
Where the attorney, although notified by the court to appear 
at a specific time, fails to do so and does not offer an excuse, 
all matters relevant to the determination of contempt happen 
in court. In those cases where the attorney seeks to excuse 
his conduct, the excuse ordinarily will be based on matters 
occurring out of court. However, the contingency that an 
attorney who is absent may later offer an excuse should not 
compel a judge, when instituting proceedings, to treat the 
conduct as indirect rather than direct contempt. 
Much of the procedure required by statute with respect 
to a charge of indirect contempt (see Code Civ. Proc., 
§§ 1211, 1212, 1217) would be pointless in a situation like the 
'one before us and is unnecessary for the protection of the 
rights of attorneys or for the orderly administration of justice. 
When it is considered that the failure of an attorney to ap-
pear at the announced time for resumption of judicial pro-
ceedings occurs in the presence of the court and is shown by 
its records, there is no reason to require the judge to file an 
affidavit or statement of facts setting forth the basis of the 
charge of contempt or to require him to give or obtain testi-
mony establishing the facts. The rights of the attorney will 
be fully protected by an order to show cause apprising him 
of the charge against him followed by an opportunity to be 
heard. If the attorney claims that his conduct is excusable, 
he is entitled to a hearing where he may offer evidence. 
Petitioner was apprised of the charge against him by the 
ot the court finding him guilty of contempt. This is an error. Minute 
order entries of the clerk are not the orders themselves. but are merely 
synopses of onll·rs Illade by the court. and do not determine the extent 
of the judicial power of the court when a formal order hag been signed 
and filed. (Rose v. Superior Court. 140 Cal.App. 418. 437 [3] et seq. 
[35 P.2d 603J.) 
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order to show cause, and he was given a full opportunity 
to present evidence in support of his claim that hi;;; cOllduct 
was excusable. Under all the circumstances, the court was 
justified in concluding that petitioner did not show a satis-
factory excuse for his failure to appear as directed. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
On the authority of Lyons v. Superior Court, 43 Ca1.2d 
755, 759 [278 P .2d 681], the majority hold that" The failure 
of an attorney, without valid excuse, to be present in court 
at the announced time for the sentencing of a client whom he 
is representing constitutes a contempt committed in the imme-
diate view and presence of the court and hence a direct con-
tempt which the court is empowered to punish summarily 
under section 1211 of the Code of Civil Procedure." (Italics 
added.) Thus, as in the Lyons case, the majority would con-
done a summary procedure that does not contemplate either 
notice or hearing. The courts of other jurisdictions that have 
considered this problem have held uniformly that such a 
contempt may be adjudicated only after adequate notice and 
hearing. (Klein v. United Stat es, 151 F.2d 286, 288 [80 App. 
D.C. 106] ; Lee v. Bauer (Fla. Sup. Ct.) 72 So.2d 792, 793; 
In re Clark, 208 Mo. 121, 146, 149 [106 S.W. 990, 15 hR.A. 
N.S. 389] ; Weiland v. Industrial Com. of Ohio, 166 Ohio St. 
62, 66 [139 N.E.2d 36] ; Ex paTte Hill, 122 Tex. 80, 82 [52 
S.W.2d 367] ; State v. Wi'nfhrop, 148 Wash. 526, 531-532 [269 
P. 793, 59 A.L.R. 1265].) The Lyons case has stimulated wide-
spread criticism. (39 Minn. L. Rev. 895; 7 Hastings L .J. 312; 
5 Duke L .J. 155; 9 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 93.) Its holding ap-
pears to be unique. 
The classification of contempts as direct and indirect is 
merely a semantic device for differentiating con tempts that 
can be adjudicated summarily from those that can be adjudi-
cated only after adequate notice and hearing. When a con-
tempt occurs within the "immediate view and presence of 
the court" the judge is fully informed of all facts necessary 
to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of the alleged contemner. 
,Yhen, however, the court is not so informed of such facts, 
notice and hearing are necessary to get them. (B1tlcke v. 
Superior Court, 14 Ca1.2d 510, 515 [94 P.2d 1006] ; In re 
Cunha, 123 Cal.App. 625, 633 [11 P .2d 902, 18 P.2d 979] ; 
Lapique v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App. 407, 412, 413 [229 
P. 1010] ; see Dangel, Contempt, § 14.) Indeed, due process 
of law requires notice and hearing in such a case. (In rll 
';: \11.1%2] C/lPL\ 1" . SU I ' El:T n n (' ()l~Wr 
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Oliucr, 333 U.S. 237, 273-278 [68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L .Ed. 682] ; 
Cooke v. Ullitcd S:II !CS, 2G7 U.S. 517, 335-537 [43 S.Ct. 390, 
69 L.Ed. 767] ; EII /ckc v. Su perior COllrt, supra, pp. 514-515; 
accord: Clark v. U1Iit ed Stal cs, 61 F .2d 695, 699, affd. 289 
U.S . 1 [63 S.Ct. 465, 77 L.Ed. 993] ; In I'C Collins, 329 Mich. 
192, 196 [45 N.\V.2d 31] ; sec nho Carso n v. Ennis, 146 Ga. 
726, 728 [92 S .E. 221, L.RA. 1917E 650] ; P eople v. Rosen-
thal, 370 Ill. 244, 248-249 [18 N.E .2d 450, 125 A .. L.R. 127] ; 
Cushman Co. v. Mackes'!}, 135 liTe. 490, 494 [200 A. 505, 118 
A.L.R. 148] ; In I'e Clark, supra; State ex rcI. Beck v. Lush, 
168 Neb. 367, 370 [95 N.W.2d 695] ; Ex parte Mylius, 61 
W.Va. 405, 407 [56 S.E. 602, 10 L.R.A. N.S. 1098, 11 Ann. 
Cas. 812].) 
In stating that" The failure of an attorney, without valid 
excuse, to be present .. . constitutes ... a direct contempt" 
(italics added), the majority opinion itself implicitly con-
cedes that petitioner's contempt, if any, cannot be subject to 
summary punishment. The absence of a valid excuse is an 
indispensable element of the contempt. The trial judge could 
not discover the nature of the excuse or determine it., validity 
without a hearing. 
In the Bulcke case, supra, this court held: "The power of 
a court to punish [summarily] for a direct contempt is based 
upon the judge's knowledge of the commission of the act by 
the contemner. A judge usually cannot say with any certainty 
that a letter or telegram received by him purporting to be 
signed by a certain person was either written or sent by that 
person; hence such an act, if contumacious, should be classi-
fi ed as an indirect contempt." Similarly, a judge usually 
cannot say with any certainty that an attorney's absence is 
"without ,alid excuse." H ence, such absence, if contuma-
cious, should be punished only after notice and hearing. 
The trial judges both in this cn .:;e and in the Lyons case 
recoguized that they did not haw the information necessary 
to decide the guilt or innoc-ence of the alleged contemners, 
and so held hearing'S in ".hich the excuses were prescnted and 
judged as to their suffic iency. In the present case the hearing 
followed formal notice in the form of an order to sho" cause. 
In the Lyons case there was no such formal notice. The judge 
orally ordered the attorney to show cnuse why he should not 
be held in contempt and dec ided immediately upon the 
validity of the excuse. 
Section 1211 and section ] 217 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure establish two procedures for the adjudication of eon-
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tempts. The first is summary, and may be invoked when 
the judge has in his possession all facts necessary for the 
adjudication of guilt or innocence. The second applies when 
the judge does not have such facts, and requires that "an 
affidavit ... be presented to the court or judge of the facts 
constituting the contempt, or a statement of the facts by the 
referees or arbitrators, or other judicial officers." The accused 
is notified of the charge against him, and the affidavit or 
statement of facts, like a complaint, indictment, or informa-
tion, frames the issues to be adjudicated at the hearing 
required by section 1217. 
Although the Legislature may not be free to limit the in-
herent power of constitutional courts to punish con tempts 
by determining that certain acts shall not constitute con-
tempt, it clearly may "provide for the procedure by which 
such contempt shall be tried and punished .... " (Bridges 
v. Superior C01lrt, 14 Cal.2d 464, 480 [94 P.2d 983].) Denial 
of this power "would be tantamount to a denial of legisla-
tive power to regulate the practice and procedure by which 
our courts are governed, a power which, "ithout constitu-
tional authority, is universally recognized in all states where 
the code system of pleading and practice prevails." (I n re 
Garner, 179 Cal. 409, 412 [177 P. 162].) The Legislature 
"may provide rules of procedure ... which, if adequate for 
the purpose designed, must be deemed operative in controlling 
the action of the court." (Ibid., p. 413.) 
Thus, any departure from the procedure set forth in the 
Code of Civil Procedure must be justified by a demonstration 
that they are inadequate, that they provide either too little 
or too much protection to those accused of contempt. There 
is no suggestion that the statutory procedures are not suffi-
ciently strict. There is no suggestion that the hearing re-
quired by section 1217 is less than that necessary to satisfy 
due process of law. Apparently any disagreement with the 
statutory procedures is based upon the view that the notice 
requirements of section 1211 are too strict. But this require-
ment, too, is minimum. The order to show cause filed by the 
judge in this case, for example, is a sufficient statement by a 
judicial officer to institute proceedings under section 1211. 
That order provides: "Please take notice that you George 
H. Chula, are hereby direeted and ordered to appear before 
this Court in Department 5 thereof at 9:00 A. M., April 14, 
1961, then and there to show cause why you should not be 
held in contempt of this Court for willful failure to obey a 
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lawful order of this Court made in this ease March 17, 1961 , 
to wit: To appear at 9 :15 a . m. before this Court, Friday, 
March 31, 1961." By alleging that pet it ioncr's fai lure to 
appear was" willful," the order meets the r equirement that 
a statement of facts under section 1211 charge kn owledge 
of the order allegedly disobeyed (see Phillips v. Superior 
Conrt , 22 Ca1.2d 256, 258 [137 P .2d 838]) and ability to 
comply. (See Jl.fcry v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 379, 380 [70 
P .2d 932].) P etitioner's failure was not willful if he did 
not know of the order or if he was unable to appear through 
no fault of his own. The allegedly contemptuous act-tM 
failure to appear as ordered-is specified in the order. The 
order to show cause thus meets the requirements for initiation 
of indirect contempt proceedings under section 1211 by fram-
ing the issues to be adjudicated at the subsequent hearing. 
(See Comm ercial Bank v. Sup c1'ior COllrt, 192 Cal. 395, 396 
[220 P. 422] ; B erger v. Superio r Court, 175 Cal. 719, 720-
721 [167 P. 143, 15 A.L.R. 373] ; Strain v. Superior Court, 
168 Cal. 216, 220-222 [142 P . 62, Ann.Cas. 1915D 702]; 
Frowley v. Superior Cow'f, 158 Cal. 220, 222 [110 P . 817] ; 
Ott's v. Superior Conrt, 148 Cal. 129, 130-131 [82 P. 853 ] ; 
Hutton v. Sup erior COllrt, 147 Cal. 156, 159 [81 P. 409]; 
Rogers v. Superior Court , 145 Cal. 88, 91 [78 P. 344] .) The 
hearing held completed the procedure in accordance with sec-
tion 1217 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
The procedure followed in the Lyons case did not comply 
with section 1211, for the oral" order to show cause" employed 
by the judge in that case gave the accused no time to prepare 
his defense, to obtain assistance, or to marshall evidence in 
support of his explanation. There is no justification for per-
mitting trial judges to institute contempt proceedings in cases 
of this kind without providing meaningful not ice and time for 
preparation. 
The statutory procedures for contempts as to which the court 
is not fully informed are entirely adequate for this kind of 
case, and are therefore controlling. (In re Garner, s1lpra. ) 
Judicial creation of a new procedure, unelaborated by statute 
or by a background of decided cases, can only add confusion 
that may easily be avoided by use of the well-defined statutory 
procedures with which our courts have had extensive expe-
rience. Anything less than the protections afforded by these 
procedures would be inadequate. 
Although the proper procedures for adjudicating the con-
tempt charged in this,case were followed, the facts established 
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do 110t support the judgment. P etitioner \\·as !lot ~ol c (·O I1l1 Srl 
for hi s eliellt, for the client had retained the firm of Monroe 
am1 CI11lla to r epresent him and Monroe represented the r.1if'llt 
before and during the trial. "We will take ju(licial noti!'!' 
of the fact that in California it is, and for a lon g t im p. has 
oeen, a gell eral custom sanctiolled by recognition of the C011rts 
for attorneys at law singly and by firms to employ attorneys 
at law to assist in legal work plated in their care, including 
appearances in court ·without the formality of being made 
attorneys of record .... The simple action of petitioner in 
line with the established custom neither satisfied the require-
ments of contempt of court nor the r equirements for con-
viction of that offense." (Raskin v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. 
App. 668, 670 [33 P.2d 35] .) In the Raskin case it was held 
that a substitute could not be held in contempt merely for 
appearing as a substitute. Similarly, the principal attorney 
who procures a competent substitute cannot be held in con-
tempt. 
Petitioner testified that he obtained a substitute, an associate 
in his office, because he was to be away in connection with 
another case. His testimony was supported by that of his 
associate and substitute. This t estimony is not in conflict with 
the client's statement that" I stopped at his office and he said 
he'd be here at 9 :15, but he isn't here." The court asked only 
where the client's" counsel" was, and he did not indicate to 
whom he had spoken. Since other attorneys than petitioner 
represented the client, there is no basis for inferring that the 
client spoke to petitioner rather than to one of the others. 
::\Iol'eoYer, the client did not say whether he had stopped at 
petitioner's office on the morning of the hearing or at some 
preyious time. 
Had the substitute appeared pnnctually, there would have 
been no basis for a contempt charge. Nor can petitioner be 
punished for his substitute's tardiness unless he authorized 
or should have foreseen it. Even if the facts might support 
a charge of contempt against the substitute, they do not sup-
port such a charge against petitioner. 
Of course unexcused absences by coullsel cannot be con-
dOlled. EYen though the r ecord indicates that petitioner has 
frequent ly fail.ed to appear in court when he should, he was 
not charged with such misconduct and it cannot justify hold-
ing bim in contempt of an order he did not violate. 
Peters, J., and Dooling, J., concurred. 
